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DONER VS. STAUFFER.
A and B agree to become partners. Each contributes $iooo.
The $2ooo are expended in tools, materials, etc. It is evident that
each of them owns every tool, every piece of material. This ownership
however, is qualified by the equal ownership of the other.
.This statement, however, is not a full exhibition of their
rights
and- of the limitations of their rights. They have tacitly stipulated
that neither shall dispose of the tools, materials, etc., without the
consent of the other, except for joint ends. In prosecuting the
business they, will contract joint obligations. They intend that the
whole of the partnership property shall be devotable tothe reduction
and extinction of these obligations. IfHA could dispose of one-half
the assets, and use the proceeds otherwise than in paying firm debts,
the consequence would be that the firm debts would remain, in full,
and B's liability for them in full, towards the creditors, would continue. B has, in other words, a lien on A's interest in the goods for
the purpose of securing the application of its value to the payment
of his share-of the debts, for which he, B, is also'liable. A has a similar lien on B's interest.
With this lien, however, the disposal by A of that part of his
share in the firm property that will remain after, in the exercise of it,
the firm debts have been paid, does not in any manner interfere.
While he has no right to transfer a firm chattel, to his creditor, to
pay his private debt, or otherwise io use it for his private benefit, he
has the right to assign what will be his residuary interest, after the
winding up of the business, and the payment by him of so much of
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the"debts as he, relatively to B, should in equity pay, to whomsoever
he will, and for whatsoever purpose. This legal fact was expressed
by Gibson C. J. in Doner v. Stauffer', thus: "It is settled by a train
of decisions that the joint effects belong to the firm, and not to the
partners, each of whom is entitled only to a share of what may remain after payment of the partnership debts."
Since each partner is thus entitled, his individual creditor is
allowed to levy upon and to sell, in execution, this residual share.
He cannot sell, his creditor cannot in execution sell, any chattel of the
firm; his creditor cannot, by attachment, appropriate any debt due
the firm- The creditor can seize and apply to his debt only the eventual interest of his debtor, the single partner, therein;2 a principle
which the Act of April 8th, 1873' recognizes, in providing for a
form of f. fa.when the object is to levy upon a partner's interest.
When then, the creditor of a partner levies on his interest in the
firm, he does not levy on any chattels of the firm; or on any of its
property. The chattels are notbound by hisf.fa. ' They are not
sold on theft. fa. After the sale. as before, they remain the property
of the partners, A and B. All that the execution vendee has bought
is A's share in the property, after all joint liabilities have been paid,
and it is clear that what he has not bought, remains the property of
and that the liabilities are also $2000.
A.
Let.us suppose that the assets are $2oooA A and B have each aright
that these assets shall be applied to these debts; A, that neither B
nor any creditor of B, shall divert his undivided half, and-B, that
neither A nor any creditor of A, shall divert his undivided half. The
consequence is, that, at the sale on the execution of A's creditor, no
one who knows the state of the firm, will pay for A's interest, anything, for he will get nothing-by his purchase. He will not obtain
the chattels, or the right even to take them into possession.
A portion of the property of A has evidently not gone to the execution vendee. A remains liable for all the firm debts. He has a
right that these firm debts shall be reduced by the application to them,
not of B's share merely, but of his own share, of the joint property,
for this share, so far as needful to pay these debts, has not been sold
from him. But the retention by A of this share, is strangely overlooked by Gibson C. J. in Doner v. Stauffer.- Speaking of the sale of
A's interest in execution, he rerharks, "it would have passed the inl1 P. &W. 198.
2Knox v. Summers, 4 Y. 477; Ward's Appeal 81-% Pa. 270; Baker's ApIeal, 21 Pa. 76; Deal v. Boque, 20 Pa. 228; Darburrow's Appeal, 84 Pa. 404;
Smith v. Emerson, 43 Pa. 456; Vanikev. Rosskam, 67 Pa. 330; Gregory's Appeal, 4 Penny. 221; Oliver's Estate 116 Pa. 43.
'P,.L. 65; P. & L. Dig. 3398.
'Smith v. Emerson, 43 Pa. 456; Cf. Deal v. Bogue, 20 Pa. 228.
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terest of the partner -(A) subject to the equity of his co-partner, and
the execution creditor would have been entitled to the price." It is
clear that it would not pass "he interest of the partner." It would
pass a fraction only of his interest, which might be considerable or
inconsiderable according to the ratio of the firm's assets to its debts.
Indeed, he himself shortly before remarked, "the execution creditor
sells, not the chattels of the partnership, but the interest of the partner encumbered with the joint debts ;" not, be it noted, encumbered
with the other partner's equity. If the chattels themselves were sold,
or A's undivided half of them, subject to B's equity only, then it
would follow that if the purchascr tendered to B one-half of the firm
debts, he would become a tenant in common with B of them; i. e.
he would extinguish B's partner's lien, a right which no case has recognized, and which is impliedly denied by Doner v. Stauffer and other
decisions. ,
If then, on the sale in execution against A only a part of his interest in the goods is sold,the right viz., to what shall remain of them or
of their value, after the satisfaction out of them, of firm debts, for
which he still remains liable, the purchaser paying not the value of
A's share of the goods, but of this residual and contingent part of
that share, the goods remain, after the sale, affected not merely by
B's right to apply them to the joint debts (a right known, so far as it
affects A's interest, as the partner's lien) but also by A's right to have
at least his own undivided half so applied. He still has property in
the goods, which should be protected in some way both as to his- late
partner, B, and to others. If B retains possession of them as-he may,
(though, since the firm is dissolved, there is no apparent reason for
giving to B rather than A the right of retention) he does so, subject
to the duty to apply them according to the original tacit or express
contract when the partnership was formed. If he should consume
them himself, if he should sell them and use all the proceeds, the part
representing A's interest, as well as that representing his own, the
man with an unsophisticated conscience, would say that he had been
guilty of a breach of trust. It would be with some amazement that
he would learn that B can not only dothis very thing but that the
Courts, if Doner v. Stauffer has its way, will do it for him.
Let us suppose, after the sale in execution against A, the goods remaining with B, that a creditor of B issues execution against him, and
levies on these goods. What will happen? Will the right of A, who
is still liable for the firm debts, to have B's half of the goods applied
to these debts, be respected? -No. The Courts punish him for having a fragment of his interest sold in execution, by enlarging the
right of the co-partner, and assisting him to withdraw his share of the
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goods from application to joint debts; in other words, they say that
A has lost the partner's lien. But this is far from being the worst.

If we are to take Gibson C. J. seriously (and he has been followed in
later decisions ') tile first sale, viz., that on the execution against A.
passed A's interest (not part of it,) subject to B's equity or lien, "But
this equity," on a subsequent execution against B, "together with the

remaining interest of the other partner (B) would have passed by the
succeeding sale to the same purchaser:" the execution creditor in
that instance also taking the proceeds." He imagines that different
purchasers had bought at the sales, but repels the idea that in that
case, the goods could be followed by joint creditors. He is confident
that these creditors could not follow the goods, if the same person
had bought at both execution sales. It is plain, we think, that C. J
Gibson intended to say that the purchaser at the second sale, bought
the goods themselves, and not simply B's interest in them; that is,
the entire interest of B, and the entire former interest of A. Cornplete ownership passed to the purchaser on the execution against B."
It is singular that in the former execution sale, only A's residual interest passed. and that on the later execution against B more than
B's residual interest passed. This, however, is not important.
What is important is, not merely that, when this full interest in the
goods is sold, on the execution against B. A's right to have B's share
applied to partnership debts should be ignored, on the ground that
he had, forfeited it, by being a defendant in an execution sale, but
that A's as yet unsold interest in the goods should be applied, not
to him, or to his creditors, but -o B's creditors.
We have supposed that the assets of the firm were worth $2000;
that the debtswere also $2000; and therefore that A's residual inter.est sold on the first ejZecution for practically zero; e. g., for five cents.
The later sale, on -the execution against B, disposes of the goods
themselves, and brings $2000; the whole.of which is applied to B's
debts; that is,$iooo 'of A's property has been taken from him, and
given to B., And this iniquity has been performed, not by B, but by
learned justices and venerated jurists. If the firm assets had beei,
$Io,ooo or $i,ooo,ooo the result would have been similar. $5,000.00
Sharswood, P. J., was not so obsequious in Brenton v. Thompson, -20
Leg. Int. 133 (1863).
2In the case the same person bought at both sales. The sameness of.
the purchaser was immaterial
3 In McNutt v. Strayhorn, 39 Pa. 269, A assigned his interest in the firm
for the benefit of his creditors.,B, the next day, assigned his interest in the
firm for the benefit of his creditors to the same person. It was held that
the' result of these two assignments was: to transfer the cliatfels of the
firm to, the 'assignee, so, that creditors- of the firm could not afterwards levy
upon them, and this was decided, while the court refused to decide whether
the result would be the application of the property to individual creditors.

THE

FORUM

or $500,00o of A's property would have been taken by the courts
and given to B's creditors; that is, to B. When principles are invented and then manipulated so as to produce such egregious results,
the ordinary man must stand aghast at the pretentious claim that
the law, (another name for dhe lucubrations of the courts) is the
"perfection of reason." Here, at least, the perfection of unreason
rather, let us say.
No practical objection can be made to the policy that the sale
on the execution against B should pass the full title to the goods to
the purchaser. They ought to have been retained by B, for the
purpose of selling them, in order to pay firm debts and the sheriff
may be regarded as doing what he should have done. But, why is
the fund produced by it taken from the firm creditors? Because, say
the courts, they. have no right to payment out of specific goods, although they once were firm goods. Very well. Why then, was not
one-half of the product or so much of it as equals one half of theie
debts paid to A, and the remainder of one half of the fund, if there
was any remainder, to the purchaser at the sale in execution against
A? This purchaser bought the right to the residuum of A's one half.
after the debts had been paid. 'Why cheat him of it? He did not
purchase the rest of A's one half. Why cheat A of this rest? A's
principal interest in the goods was left unsold, in order that it might
be applied in his relief to the firm creditors. Why take it from him.
he still remaining liable for these debts, and give it to B?
Procedural reasons cannot be alleged as an excuse for this monstrous result. Had the interests of the two partners been sold together, the court would in distributing the proceeds, have investigated sufficiently to ascertain the respective interests of the partners,
as was done in Doner v. Stauffer, and several later cases. An auditor could be appointed, who might ascertain the debts of the firm.
If, refusing to hear those who had no "lien" on, the fund, a refusal,
for which under the circumstances, there would be the justification
of precedent only, the court declined such investigation, what hinders
its awarding the money, as in other cases, when the fund exceeds the
lien, to the owners of the chattels whose sale produced it, viz., to A,
and the vendee of A's partial interest, and to B? Much more difficult things are undertaken by courts in the administration of justice.
There is however a remarkable deviation from the principles laid
down, when the sales of A's and B's interests take place simultaneously. It is true that in Doner v. Stauffer, Gibson C. J. argues that
there is no difference between successive sales and simultaneous sales
of these interests, but he proceeds to show that there is a very material difference. If the sale on the execution against A, preceded
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that on the execution against B, the effect would be to give to the
purchaser at the first sale only A's share in the excess of the value
of .the assets over the liabilities, and to A's creditor, and A himself.
only the price of this excess, but, if a sale on an execution against
I1 occurs at the same time, then, strange to say, A's creditor and A
are entitled to one half of the proceeds of the sale, and B's creditor
and 13, only to the other half'. The accident of some creditor of B
issuing fi fa.in time to cause a coetaneous sale of his and his partner's
interests may determine whether A and his creditors shall get nothing, or a million dollars! If the assets are worth two millions of dollars, and the debts amount to two millions, and the sale on execution against A is made before that on the execution against
B. A's vendible interest is worth Y2 of $2,ooo,ooo-$2,ooo,ooo
or o: whereas, if the sale on the execution against B occurs at the
same time, A's vendible interest is worth one half of $2,000,000 and

his execution creditors and he will get $i,ooo,ooo. Principles and
methods of procedure that make such a result possible are self-condenled.,
it is well here to advert to a different interpretation which some
jurists of distinction have put on Doner v. Stauffer. At the beginning of his opinion C. J. Gibson remarks that nothing else can be sold,
on an execution against a partner for his personal debt, than his
"share of what may remain after payment of the partnership debts,"
Later, he states that the interest of the partners, "encumbered with
the joint debts" is sold. Strictly interpreting this last expression, the
views are inconsistent. To sell the interest of the partner A, encumbered with the joint debts, would be to sell the interest with the
risk that the lien of the other partner B might be asserted in behalf
of joint.debts, but also with the possibility that it would not. If B
chose not to-enforce the lien, if for any reason he lost the lien, as by
a sfibsequent sale of his interest ior private debts, the purchaser of A's
interest would hold it free from this lien.
A consequence would be, as Rapallo J. points out, in Menagh v.
Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146, that, by an act done by B, after the sale, the
interest he acquired might be greatly increased in value. Let us
suppose that the assets are worth $200,000, that A and B are equal
partners, and that the debts of the firm are $15o,ooo. The share of
A in the assets, is $ioo,ooo, but B's lien on them, if asserted, will
leave only $25,o00 to represent it. Should however, B not assert the
lien, as by suffering a later sale of his interest for a private debt, the
firm creditors will lose all right of access to the fund, B will have lost

' This result of simultaneous sales has been recognized later; e. g., in
Kelly's Appeal, 16 Pa. 59; Coover's Apeal, 29 Pa. 9.
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his lien in respect to these debts, and the vendee of A's interest who
paid perhaps, less than $25,ooo for that interest will get $Ioo,ooo.
Meantime A continues liable for all the debts of the firm; his property intrinsically worth $ioo,ooo, has been taken from him for $25,0oo,
on the pretext that it can be sold again, for the firm debts, and yet,
by an act over which he has no control, it is not sold for the debts,
and the power to sell them is lost. No wonder that the judge characterizes this result as an "injustice" and an "absurdity."
A similar interpretation seems to be put on C. J. Gibson's position by Sharswood, J. in his MSS lectures at the University of Pennsylvania. "The practical operation of the doctrines set forth in the
opinion in Doner v. Stauffer" he remarks, "would be that the purchaser, though buying an encumbered title, under the first execution,
(against A) by the legerdemain of a second sale under an execution
against the other partner (B) is thereby vested with an absolute unencumbered title without paying for it, or what is worse, if the second
purchaser is a different person, he gets a clear title, and by .the
same title, clears the title of the first purchaser. Thus, by this process, the separate creditors of the partner last sold out, get the full
price of his share discharged of debts, though he may be entitled to
little or nothing after the debts are paid, and his partner's interest
which has been sacrificed by a sale incumbered with an uncertainty,
may be by far the largest. A decision to put the interest of the
partners as well as the joint creditors, so completely at sea, to the
mercy of the winds and waves, I think, I hope at least, will never be
made."' .
By this interpretation, Gibson, C. J., is made to teach that the
share of A in the partnership assets is passed by the sale on execution
against him, subject to the other partner, B's, lien on it; a lien which
may afterwards be lost, by the act of B, without co-operation of A.
The cases, however, hold explicitly, that A's interest as against the
partnership, is simply the right to an account and, that this is all that
a sale of it by him, or by an execution against him passes. Gibson C.
J. states that "the joint effects belong to the firm, and not to the partners ; i. e. he imputes a quasi-corporate status to the partnership
and holds that the partners have only a share in a residuum, like that
of the stockholders in a corporation. This view being probably the'
one that Gibson C. J. intended to assert, it follows as we have said,
not that A's undivided half in the chattels of the firm is sold on the
execution against him, burdened with a mere lien of the other part' In Brenton v. Thompson, 20 L. I. 133, Sharswood, P. J., decided that
a sale of a partner's interest did not destroy his equity to have the chattels

of the firm applied to firm debts, despite Gibson, C. J.'s, dictum to the con-

trary.,
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ner for the debt, but that only the half of the difference between the
assets and liabilities is sold. The other portion of A's interest remains unsold.
In order to aver: consequences so absurd and abhorrent as those
above indicated, several things might be done.
i. The principle that, on a sale in execution against a partner
A. his residual interest only, can be sold, might be abandoned. The
abandonment would involve the loss by the sale of the other partner,
B's, lien. But, the present system destroys A's lien by the sale.
If. A being an equal partner, his half interest in the goods levied on,
were sold, their full value would be brought.
2. If B's lien is too sacred to be thus sacrificed, it should be held
that neither A's lien, nor the whole of his interest, when there are
firm debts, is lost by the sale on an exetution against him, and that
B must use the assets, his own share of them as well as A's, in paying
partnership debts, so that a salc of his interest, would pass only a
residual interest, and the goods would remain, in the control of A and
B. for the purpose of sale in satisfaction of firm debts.
3. If it is preferred that control of the goods should on the sale
of A's interest, pass, to B, and that a sale on execution against B,
should pass the goods, let the proceeds be administered under the
court's direction so, that they shall be first applied to firm debts; the
balance divided ratably with the shares of the partners; A's share divided between the purchaser at the execution against him and A;
and, since, at the second sale, the-purchaser has the goods, all that
he expected to get, B's half paid to his execution creditor, if his debt
is so large; if not, the balance paid to B. If the court is unwilling to
abandon its notion that the second sale has destroyed all lien for
partnership debts, then let the proceeds be divided between A and B,
in the ratio of their shares in the firm; A's share of the debts ascertained, and so much of his share of the fund paid to him, as would
pay his half of the debts, and the remainder of his half paid to the purchaser at the first execution sale, of this remainder. Let the other
half be paid to the execution against B, if there is any, and -anyresidue
be paid to B.
It would be better still, to regard the sale in execution against 13,
as Sharswood J. does, as passing only the same kind of an interest as
did A's;, in which case, the goods themselves would remain unsold.
Then B's creditor would by his execution, make no more than A's
creditor, by his, though no injustice is. inflicted by this dissimilarity.
WILLIAM -TRICKETT-
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MOOT COURT
MECHANICS

& FARMERS' BANK vs. ALBANY

EXPRESS CO.

Common Carrier-Theft-Insanity of Servant-Act of God-Destruction

of

Bank Notes-Measure of Damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The Albany Express Co. receives at Buffalo a package of bank bills
sealed up and directed to the Mechanics and Farmers Bank in the city of
Albany. The package purported to contain $10.000, and when it was delivered into the hands of the express company did contain that amount. The
package arrived in Albany and was delivered at the banking house of the
Mechanics and Farmer's Bank apparently the same as received. On open.
ing it $3,000, part of it, was found to be wanting, and paper substituted in its
place. On inquiry it is ascertained that the missing money was all in Mechanics and Farmer's Bank bills and that the same were taken from the
package at Syracuse by a person in the employ of the express company while
in a fit of mental derangement, suddenly and for the first time occurring, and
that the bills had been burnt by him while so deranged. The express company deny all liability and the bank bring their action.
Smith and Cohen for the plaintiff.
An Express Company is liable as insurer for loss of goods intrusted
vs.
to it for transportation. Leonard vs. Hendrickson, 18 Pa. 40; Verner
Sweizer, 32 Pa. 208; Armstrong vs. Express Co., 159 Pa. 640.
Thompson and Memolo for the defendant.
Carrier excused by Act of God. Walpole vs. Buge, 9 Am. Dec. 427;
Ponna. R. R. Co., vs. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315. No recovery can be had by
Ihank for the bills totally destroyed. Hagerstown Bank. vs. The Adams
Express Co., 45 Pa. 419; 6 Wendell 379.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LABAR, J.:-It is a well settled rule of law that Common carriers are
insurers of goods carried in that capacity, against all losses or damage, except those caused by the act of God, the public enemy, act of the shipper,
lublic authority, and the inherent nz.ture of the goods.
Hale on Bailments and Carriers, page 351.
The Express company is a common carrier and was upon receipt by it of
the package of bank bills directed to the plaintiff bank bound by law to deliver the same to them.
Verner vs. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208.
Where the goods do not arrive at their place of destination or arrived In
a damaged condition, or are not all delivered, this-is a prima facie breach of
his warranty for which the Carrier is liable.
In the case at bar when the express Company received the package it
purported to contain bills representing $10,000. On delivery to the bank it
was found that $3000, part of it, was wanting. These facts alone are sufficient
to show liability on the part of the Express Company unless it shows that
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the loss falls within one of the excepted perils.
Defendant contends that the sudden fit of mental derangement of their
agent was such an act of God as to relieve them from all liability. We are of
the opinion that such circumstances do not come within the meaning of the
phrase "Act of God." An act of God is such an act of nature, entirely unconnected with any human agency, and it must be the exclusive cause -of the
loss or the carrier will be liable:
Hale on Bailments and Carriers, p. 358.
He is an insurer against such perils as it is his duty to provide against,
and among these are such as arise from the use of defective or inadequate
instruments of carriage, and from the employment of incompetent, negligent
or criminal servants.
Willock vs. R. R., 166 Pa. 189.
Farnham et a! vs. R. R. Co., 55 Pa. 53.
What is the measure of damages to be allowed? The amount of damages is to be estimated from the character, quality and quantity of the goods
and the nature of the injuries shown by the proof.
Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 5 p. 377..
By the facts of the cas*e the notes stolen which were all of the plaintiff's
own bills have been totally destroyed so that they can never be presented to
the bank for payment. In Hagerstown Bank vs. Adams Express Company,
45 Pa. 419, the rule was laid down that where bank notes are totally destroyed the owner thereof can recover their value from the bank. But in
that case the notes were not destroyed by the agent of the Express company
until after the Express Company had paid the amount of the bills to the
Bank. The Court in allowing the Express Company to recover based its decision upon the grounds that the title to the notes had passed to the plaintiff
and that the notes had been totally destroyed. The lower court said in his
charge to the jury which was affirmed by the Supreme Court that "had the
destruction of this money been known before the company paid the bank we
cannot doubt of its right to resist payment." It follows from this that If the
Express companyhad paid to the bank the amount of the bills stolen, that upon proof of their destruction the Express company could have recovered the
same from the bank.
No principle is better established nor more necessary to be maintained
than that bank notes are not money in the legal sense of the word. They are
merely promissory notes for the paynent of money.
Gray vs. Donald, 4 Watts 400.
Therefore the bank has suffered no serious loss by reason of the failure
to deliver and the destruction of the notes and their damages, if any, are only nominal.
Substantial damages can be recovered for a breach of contract only on
proof that actual damages resulted.
P. & L. Dig. of Dec., Vol. 3, Col. 4585.
The defendant is guilty of a breach of contract for the non-delivery of
these notes and wherever there is a breach of an agreement or the invasion
of a right, the law infers some damages, and if no evidence Is given of any
particular amount of loss, it gives nominal' damages by way of declaring the
rightL
Am. and Eng. Ene. of Law, Vol. 8, p. 553.
Judgment for plaintiff for nominal damages.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The express company, a common carrier, became a carrier of the Bank
bills. Schouler, Bailments, 369, 3d Ed. The abstraction and destruction of
the $3000, were performed by the servant of the company, at Syracuse. He
was iitsane, but that was no excuse for his act. He was liable, for damages
occasioned by It.. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. vs. Showalter, 3 Superior, 452; Sheppard vs. Wood, 1 Lane. L. R. 175; 9 P. & L. Dig. 14558. It would follow that
the company would be liable for it to the Bank. The principle is not too
broad that "any loss on which a carrier might found his action for damages,
because of another party's wrong," cannot be attributed to an act of God.
Schoulor, Bailments, p 417.
Had the bank packed up blank pieces of paper, and sent them by the express, the company would have been bound to transmit them safely, and
though this paper had no palpable value, nominal damages could have been
recovered.
The $3000 bills destroyed, were the promises to pay of the plaintiff.
They w re worth as the bank's property, not the $3000, but still something.
The bank could have reissued them, and thus keeping them in circulation,
havd earned the interest on that sum. It might cost something to have simtlar notes executed.
Judgment affirmed.

POLSGROVE vs. POTTS.

Contract to Convey Real Estate-Parol

Evidence-Statute

of Frauds.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Paul Potts owned a rectangular tract of land bordering for 210 feet on
Hanover Street, and extending back 150 feet. He agreed with Peter Polsgrove, in writing, to convey to the said Peter "160 feet of my lot on Hanover
Street. "A week after the two marked a line 100 feet from the south end of
the lot and running at right angles to the front and rear line from the former
to the latter.
Oral evidence is offered to the effect that this was dorma to define and sell
off the piece intended by the parties to be sold and bought. Still later Polsgrove threw some stones on the piece thus marked off for him with a view
to laying a pavement in front of it. Potts repenting of his bargain refuses to
convey though a deed to be executed Dy him is tendered to him with the
purchase money. Polsgrove files the 1311 to compel conveyance.
Johneon for the Plaintiff.
It is not necessary that the consideration involve a benefit moving to tha
promisor; it is enough that there be a detriment to the promisee.
Such
was the situation in the present case. Duke vs. Smith, 14 Utah 35; Burns
vs. Landus 114 Cal. 310; Blspham'sEquity, 496.
Vendor is estopped by his words, actions and silence from col Ing up a
valid defense. Woodward vs. Tudor 81* Pa. 382; Cnapman vs. Clulupnuu
59 Pa. 214; Folk vs. Beedlman 6 Watts 329.
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McAlee for the Defendant;
Specific performance is of grace, not of right.. P. & L. 8558. Where
a contract is uncertain eqity will not interfere to compel specific performauce. H. Ammes vs. McEldowey 46 Pa. 334; Freeman vs. Stokes 4 W. N.
C. 459; Ander's Estate 5 W. N. C. 78. Lee's Appeal 12 W. N. C. 138.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SHOWALTER, J.:-The contract between Paul Potts and Peter Pols
grove is rather Indefinite as to th3 subject matter In dispute. There was an
agreement reduced to writing and the only reason that a chancellor should
hesitate to enforce this contract is the fact, that the land to be conveyed was
not sufficiently well described.
In attempting to decide this case the court will assume, that the price
was stated in the contract, that the contract was signed by the vendor and
that it was then delivered to the vendee.
Is this sufficient to decree a specific performance? We think not. A
chance!lor can only enforce an agreement specifically where the parties have
agreed upon all its terms and left nothing to the future, but mere performance. An agreement to convey a lot of ground can not be specifically enforced where the agreement fails to identify the land in question, either in
terms or by reference to an existing plan but merely says "the size of the lo
of ground secured or intended to be secured by the purchaser to be determined hereafter and to conform to the general plan regarding the convenience and economy hereafter to be laid out and established;" and this is the
case although the lot is further referred as the piece of ground on which the
purchaser now resides.
Agnew v Southern Avenue Land Co. 204 Pa. 192. In this case the court
refused to decree specific performance.
If the plaintiff were compelled to rely only upon the written contract to
sustain this action, he would certainly fail. He would be entitled to nothing
more than damages as found in a court of law. But the transaction did not
stop with the writing of the contract In pursuance thereof the plaintiff and
the defendant went upon the land and measured off a certain part of it. For
what reason the statement of facLs does not disclose but it is only a sensible
presumption, that it was to Indicate the land to be conveyed. The fact that
the same parties to the contract went upon the land and measured off a part
of it could raise no other presumption than that the intention was to indicate
the land to be conveyed. This makes the subject of the contract definite
enough that a court of equity can decree specific performance.
To strengthen the position of the plaintiff, he has placed material upon
the land to build a pavement. The defendant has not objected to his so doing. Certainly justice and right would not allow him to stand by without objection while the plaintiff was making improvements on the land, and then
allow him to repudiate his contract. He is estopped by his inaction. The
equities are all with the plaintiff. Going upon the land and measuring it off
made the contract certain, and he has tendered the purchase money. This
is all the plaintiff could be, in justice, expected to do.
And now, the defendant Is ordered to convey the said tract of land in disiute to the plaintiff and give a good am' sufficient deed therefor.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Potts owned a piece of land which was 210 feet long upon Hanover
street, and extended back friom that street, 150 feet. He contracted in writ-
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ing to convey "100 feet of his lot on Hanover Street" Were the intended feet
at the north end, or the south end, or in the middle, or at some intervening
place? No answer is given to this quostion by the writing. The Statute of
Frauds, requiring contracts for the sale of land to be in writing, requires that
the writing shall reasonably define the boundaries and locus, of the ground.
There is no such definition here; Holthouse v. Rynd, 9 Sadler, 193; Mellon
v. Davison, 123 Pa. 298; Agnew v. Southern Avenue Land Co., 204 Pa. 192.
Harrisburg Board of Trade v. Eby, I Dauph. 99. Specific performance of the
contract, therefore, whether by bill in equity or by ejectment will be refused.
This writing, so defective that specific performance would be refused,
might have been followed by another writing defining the ground, and the
two might have been so connected by internal reference in the later to the
earlier, as to be susceptible of being treated as one agreement, and enforceable. No subsequent writing was executed. The parties, two weeks after
the making of the contract, marked a line 100 feet from the south end of the
lot, and running at right-angles to the front and rear line, from the former to
the latter. The intention of the vendor was, to allot the piece south of this
line, to the vendee in performance of his agreement. But, the running of the
line, and the Intent with which it was done, are both established by oral evidence. The learned court below hag found the writing too defective to sustain a decree for specific performance. but considering In conjunction with it,
this oral evidence of definition of the tract, has awarded a decree. In this
we think, there was error.
The land intended might have been later defined by a draft, as it was actually defined by the running of the line on the ground. But, the draft itself,
not referred to in the writing, could not be used to supplement it. Still less
could the mere running of the line. Mellon v. Davison, supra. The running
of the line, and the intention being proved, the intended land is established.
but It is established by parol, in defiance of the statute.
Has the contract been made enforceable by the taking of possession, the
payment of the purchase money, and the making of improvements? The only possession taken, is throwing some stones on the lot, with a view to laying
a pavement in front of it. How maijy is not shown. There may have been
two, or six, or twenty, or a hundred. This surely is not a taking of possession. But, conceding that it was, we find no payment of purchase money, no
making of improvements that could not be compensated for. There has happened nothing to exempt the contract from the operation of the statute.
Decree reversed, and bill dismissed.

MAHON vs. BERKELY.

Bailment-Depositurn-Bailee's

Lien.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Mahon finds in the interior of this state an article of great value, which
Berkely has lost. Mahon expends upon it both services and money for the
purpose of preserving it. Berkely demands of Mahon the article, and Mahon
insists that he has a right to retain it until payment of his lien for services
rendered and money expended. Upon Berkely's threatening to sue him, he de-
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livers up the article under protest and subsequently brings an action against
Berkely for such services and money.
Keenan and Sorber for the Plaintiff.
If a chattel is taken up and preserved by the finder at some expense
of both time and money and the rightful owner afterwards comes and receives, thereby accepting the benefit of the expenses thus incurred he is
bound to reimburse the finder. Rudy vs. Anderson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 193;
Chase vs. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286; Edwards on Bailments 320.
Lewis and Arnold for the Defendant.
tinder has no lien for expenses gratuitously incurred in taking care of
lost property. Etter v. Edwards, 4 Watts 63.
Finder hac no lien on property as finder although he may have lien for
reward offered. Wood v. Pierson, 45 Mich. 313.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
REED, J.-The question as to whether the finder of lost property can recover compensation for the labor and expense he may voluntarily bestow upon the property, seems never to have been decided by the Pennsylvania
courts In a late case, Hendler v. Perkins, 4 Pa. Sup. 345, Judge Orlady says,
"it is doubtful whether a finder of lost property can recover for labor and
expenses voluntarily bestowed upon the thing found." We have a dictum,
however, in Etter v. Edwards, 4 Watts, 63, to the effect that, "it is probabl-3
that a court of justice would go as far as it could towards enforcing the payment of reasonable expenses."
Az common law the finder of lost goods had no lien for expenses incurred
in the preservation of the article, but could claim and recover them in an action: Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. BI., 254; Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 256;
Amory v. Flyn, 10 Johns (N. Y.) 102; Reeder v. Anderson, 4 Dana (Ky.), 193.
This iule has been followed in the following cases: Tome v. Four Cribs of
Lumber, Tancy (U. S.) 533; Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484; Baker v. Hoag,
7 Barb (N. Y.) 113; Reeder v. Anderson, supra; Chase v. Corcoran, supra;
Watt-3 v. Ward, 1 Ore. 86. This seems to us to be the correct rule.
Hale in his work on Bailments says, "While bailees for the sole benefit
of the bailor are not entitled to any compensation for their services, they are
entitled to recover their actual disbursements and expenses necessarily incurred for the preservation of the deposit. This is naturally implied in the
underiaking because a gratuitous act would otherwise become a burden."
This rule we believe applies to those on whom as in the present case, the
rights and liabilities of bailee are imposel by operation of law, as well as to
those who become bailees by express contract.
It may be argued that Mahon has waived his right to recover In this action, because of his having delivered up the article to Berkely. Such Is not
our view of the case. He would have been liable for conversion had he retained the article: Etter v. Edwards. supra. He cannot, therefore, be said to
have -vaived his right to bring this action.
The plaintiff here asks for compensation for services rendered and money
expended. Under the decisions and principles of law as above given, we believe be can only recover for money actually spent in caring for and preserving the article.
The finder of lost goods is held to be a bailee under an implied contract
of deposit: Hale on Bailments, page 39, and cases cited. If he voluntarily assumes the care of them, he is burdened with the liabilities of a depositary.
In this class of bailments it is of the very essence of the contract that the
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custody or service be gratuitous. We are unable to see, therefore, any reason why one on whom the relation of depository is imposed by operation of
law should recover for services rendered.
We instruct the jury, from the evidence submitted, to ascertain the actual expenditures made by plaintiff, necessary for the preservation of the article, and render judgment for plaintiff for such expenditures.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
When an article of value is lost, a sound policy would suggest the adoption of such principles with regard to compensation of the finder as would
probably induce him to restore the article to its owner, and meantime to preA's horse has wandered away.
serve it from destruction or deterloTation.
B ses it. The safety of the horse depends on B's taking it up, feeding it,
otherwise caring for it. If he can get no compensation for his trouble and
for the value of the things he expends on the horse's preservation, he will
have a motive not to take up the horse, or, taking it up, not to care for itor to adopt means to evade the search of the owner. What is true respectIt
ing the lost horse, is true rcspectipy any other lost article of value.
would be reasonable to require the owner, if he claims and retakes the article, to compensate the finder for the trouble and expense incurred by him
in its preservation. But for the finder's acts there would probably be no recovery of the thing, or, if recovered, it would be in a condition making it'%
hardly worth recovering.
The court with some approach to unanimity, hold that the finder will
have no lien on the article, for his outlays. He must, even before reimbursement, deliver it to its owner on the demand of the latter. Chase v. Corcoran,
106 Mass. 286; Wood v. Pierson, 45 Mich. 313; Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray,
222: Ettcr v. Edwards, 4W. 63. But, if a right to compensation is conceded
to the finder, there is no appreciable reason for denying to him the remedy ot
a lien. When a bailment is made in order that work may be done by the
ballee, a lien Is given to him for the compensation. It ought not to matter
whether the possession and service were the result of a contract, or not, if
the law yields to the possessor who benefits the thing, a compensation. If
for a contractual compensation there is a lien, there ought to be a lien fo.
non-contractual but-obligatory compensation.
The denial to the finder of the ight to a lien, is however not a denial cl
for among the cases denying the former, are
his right to compensation;
some that either do not deny or expressly concede the latter. Preston v.
Neale, 12 Gray, 222; Chase v. Coicoran, 106 Mass. 286. Etter v. Edwards,
supra, while holding that there is no lien, states that, at the time of the writing of the opinion, 1835, it is as yet "undetermined" whether the finder can
recover an indemnity. The Superior Court seems to think, in 1897, that the
right to indemnity is "doubtful;" Hendler v. Perkins, 4 Super. 344, but it
cites only Etter v. Edwards, decided sixty-two years before, which states
merely that the matter is "undetermined."
No distinction is made in these cases, between the expenses incurred oy
the finder, and the labor expended by him in the preservation of the found
property. It is difficult to justify such distinction. The labor of the finder
has a market value as well as that of another whom he might hire to perform
it. The distinction seems to be ignored in Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286:
Reeder v. Anderson, 34 Ky., (4 Dana) 193. If there is a finder's right to be
paid for the money he has spent, we think there is a right to be paid for th3
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labor, supervision, services he has rendered with the same object. Some of
the latter are as Indispensable as the benefits procured by the outlay of
money.
When a ballee receives goods for the sole benefit of the bailer, he is not
entitled to compensation for his services, for he has impliedly or expressly
agreed to render them gratuitously. If he received the thing in order to labor upon it, and to be paid for his labor, the bailment would be for his own
benefit, as well as that of the bailor. The same policy of law that would secure to a finder, compensation for his moneys would also secure it for his labor. It is often as beneficial to the owner that the latter, as the former
should be bestowed, and it is equally unjust to allow the owner to take the
thing, benefitted by the labor, without recompense for it, as to take it benefitted by the labor of others, for which the finder has paid, or by the application of property to it, which the finder has spent money in procuring. In
Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286, a boat found derelict on the Mystic river,
was rescued and turned to the shore. Its bottom in which were holes, and
the keel of which was nearly demolished, was repaired, it was stored in th,,
finder's barn for two winters. When it was found, it was worth but $5.00.
The owner had received it from the finder, who then bringing an action for
compensation, was held entitled to recover $26. No distinction was drawn
between the money expended and the labor done, by the finder. Indeed It
does not appear that he expended any money. The claim was for moving
and repairing the boat and for the finder's care and trouble in keeping it. C!.
also Reeder v. Anderson, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 193.
The decision of the learned court below, that the delivery by the plaintiff
to the defendant, on the demand of the latter, of the article, does not preclude his recovery of compensation in the present action, is well supported
by its reasoning.
It follows, from what we have said, that the judgment of the court below,
on this appeal of the defendant, must be affirmed. More might have been recovered from him, under the law as we apprehend it to be. The right to complaint belongs not to him but to the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.

STEARNS vs. STEVENS.

Sale-Agency-Authority of Agent to Receive Payment

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
There are three parties, Stearn', a wholesale flour dealer, Stevens, a grocer, amd Stokes, a gentleman.-On the first of May 1861, Stokes called on
Stevens at his store and inquired -:fhe wished to purchase flour, Informing
him that Stearns had a large quantity, and would sell the kind mentioned at
$8.00 rer barrel, if he could sell fifty barrels together for cash, the retail market price then being $8.50 per barrel. Stevens replied that he would purchase that quantity at that price, delivered at his store. Stokes then left,
and shortly afterwards called on Stearns, and informed him that Stevens
wished him to send him fifty barrels of flour of a description such as he had
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agreed to receive. Stearns supposing him to be Stevend' agent, and knowing
Stevens to be in good credit sent the fifty barrels to Stevens' store, where they
were received and disposed of. Stokes soon after called at the store of Stevens with a bill of the flour, purporting to be receipted by Stearns. Upon
this forged receipted bill he received the money, and has never since been
heard of. He was unknown to either party nor employed by either, further
than the above facts would go to show employment. Stearns, after waiting a
proper time, presented his bill and demanded payment. Stevens refused to
pay, and this action is brought for the price of the flour.
Duffy and Gardner for the plaintiff.
An o-ner cannot be divested of his property without his consent, unless he has placed it in the custody of another and given him the apparent
right to dispose of it. Barker vs. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427.
An agent employed to make sales on credit, has no authority by implication to collect the price In the name of the principal. Seiple vs. Irwin,
30 Pa. 513.
Lindley and Tobin for the defendant.
Defendant submitted to judgment on the authority of Barker vs. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427. Seiple vs. Irwin, 30 Pa. 513. McCulloeh vs. McKee, 16
Pa. 289.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
ROUSH, J.:-In this case through the conduct of Stokes, a valid contract was ontercd into between the plaintiff and the defendant, which was
partially executed. The plaintiff agreed to sell and the defendant agreed
to buy fifty barrels of flour. The only thing that was necessary to complete
the sale, was the payment of the purchase money; and this is an action for
that money.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff delivered the flour to the person to
whom he irntended it should be delivered; and it was received by the defendant, as coming from the plaintiff. There was, therefore a valid delivery
and the property in the flour passed to the defendant. He became, therefore
responsible to the plaintiff for the value of the flour.
But did the defendant discharge himself from the obligation by paying
the money to Stokes? The law is well settled that the owner can not be divested of his property without his own consent, unless he has place6d it in
the posse..sion or custody of another and given him an -pparent or implied
right to dispose of it; Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427. Stokes never had
the custody or possession of the flour: nor was he the agent of the plaintiff,
with authority to collect the money from the defendant. An agent is a pers- n duly authorized to act on behalf of another, or one whose unauthorized
act hac been duly ratified; Wolf v. Horneastle, 1 Brs. & Pal. 316. Agency
cannot be implied without proof that the principal knew that the alleged
agent was acting for him, or unless he ratified his act; Creighton v. Keith,
16 Phila. 130. As Stokes, was not the agent of the plaintiff, and the defendant paid the money to Stokes, without authority so to do, It follows that the
defendant is still liable to the plaintiff for the value of the flour. We think
that on.account of said reasons, and on account of the law as laid down in
Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427, our judgment must be for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
not,
nor did he profess to be the agent of Stearns. He knew
Stokes was
that Iearns had flour for sale, and knew or surmised that he would sell it,
quantities not less than fifty barrels. at $8.00 per barrel. He gave Stevens
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this 'information, who, possibly believing (though this Is not certain) that
Stokes was an agent of Stearns, authorized him to inform Stearns that he
would take fifty barreli, at the price named. Stokes informed Stearns, who
sent the flour. It was received by Stevens, who thus, became indebted to
Stearns, to the extent of $400.
The question is, has this debt been paid? Stokes, soon after the delivery of the flour, called on Stevens with a "bill of the flour, purporting to be
receipted by Stearns." The bill is described as "this forged receipted bill,"
but, whether the bill had been made out by Stearns, and whether the receipt
only, was forged, is not clear. Nothing proved warrants us in inferring that
Stearns gave any authority to Stokes to collect the money. Nor had he "held
out" Stokes as haviug such authority. Stokes' first act was done, on the impulsion of Stevens. If he was the ag'mt of either the plaintiff or the defendant, he was the agent of the latter. He orders the flour in Stevens' name,
and it is sent. He is not authorized to act for Stearns in collecting the money. Stevens has given $400 to one to whom Stearns has done nothing to authorize him to assume that he, Stearns had given any authority to receive it
for him. He has taken the risk of its not being handed over to Stearns.
Even if Stokes bad been an agent to procure orders for flour he was not
an agent to make sales. The orders had to be communicated to Stearns. He
had no authority, therefore, to receive payment; 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1016.
Nor, had he been agent to make sales, could he have had implied, authority
subsequently to collect the price if the sales were made on credit. Seiple v.
Irwin, 30 Pa. 513; 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1015, 1016. Stearns, it appears, was
induced to sell the flour, by his knowledge that Stevens was In "good credit,"
and, it is found that, "after waiting a proper time," he presented his bill and
demanded payment. The sale was therefore on credit. Had Stevens therefore, had a right to think Stokes agent of Stearns to make the sale, he did
not have the right to believe him authorized to receive payment later.
The cdecision of the. learned court below has properly disposed of the
case.
Judg-ment affirmed.

HARRY STOKES v. SAMUEL THROPE.

Fee Tail Special-Effect of Act of Apr. 27, 1855 on Estates Tail.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
land to Mary Stokes, "and the heirs of her body of
devised
Staples
Win.
her present husband." She had two sons by him still living. On his death
she married again and by her second husbnnd, John Barnard, had two sons.
Harry Stokes is the oldest of the cIildren. She dying the younger child by
the first marriage and the children by the second, claiming to be co-heirs.
have taken possession of three undivided fourths. This is ejectment by
H-arry to obtain sole possession.
Barner for the plaintiff.
Any explanation attached to the word "heirs," which acts as a limitation of the heirs general, will take the case out of the Rule in Shelley's
452.
McCann, 197 Pa.
v.
Case, Hoge v. Hoge, 1S. & R. 143; McCoinn
Jones v. Jones, 201 Pa. 548.
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The Act
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ed according
strued to be
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Binn. 374.
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flor the defendants.
of April 27, 1855, P. L., 368, See. 1, provides: "Whenever heregift, conveyance or devise, an estate in fee tail would be creatto the existing laws of this state, it shall be taken and conan estate in fee simple,"etc.
requisite to the creation of an estate tail by will, that the tes3
use the words "heirs of the body." Wall v. Vandegrift,
OPINION OF THE COURT.

LAUB, J.:-The plaintiff contends that the estate given to Mary Stokes
was simply a life estate with remainder to the two sons of her body with her
husband who was then living.
We are unable to accept this view. The devise was to Mary Stokes,
"and the heirs of her body of her present husband." Such language seems
to create an estate tail. A limitation in such technical language as to one
"and the heirs of his body," will even in a will create an estate tail, except
where it is clear from the context that the testator intended to give some
other estate. Duer v. Boyd, 1 S. & R. 203; Phila. Trust Etc., Co.'s Appeal, 93
Pa. 209.
As the word "heirs" is necessary to create a fee, so in further limitation
of the strictness -of the fcodal donation, the word "body" or some words
of procreation are necessary to make it a fee tail, and ascertain to what
heirs in particular the fee is limited. Jones v. Jones, 201 Pa. 548. Where
the intention of the testator has been ascertained, that the remaindermen
are to take as heirs, general or special, then the Rule in Shelley's Case applies
without exception and converts the estate into one of inheritance. The actual intention of the donor on this question is of no weight whatever; in fact,
a very cle-ir expression that the rule shall not apply and the first taker shall
have but a life estate is to be disreg-arded, and the life estate combines with
the remainder into an estate in fee or in tail. Carter v. McMichael, 10 S. &
R. 429; Auman v. Auman, 21 Pa. 343.
In Carter v. McMichael, supra, the devise was to a son for life "and after
his decease to the heirs male of the body' of my said son lawfully to be begotten, and the heirs and assigns of such heirs or heir male forever" and
Tilghman, C. J., held that the son tcok an estate in fee tail.
In George v. Morgan, 16 Pa. 95, the devise was to a son "during his natural life, and after his decease to the heirs of his body lawfully begotten and
to their heirs forever," and Ball, J., held the son took an estate in fee tail.
In Lehndorf v. Cope, (Ill.), 13 N. E. Rep. 505, the devise was in almost the
very same language as in the devise in question. The devise in said case
was to M. "and her heirs by her pdesent husband, H." and the court held
that M took an cstate tail.
But it might be said that the testator did not mean to give the first
taker an estate tail. Perhaps he did not. But he has used words which in
law mean nothing else. If he intended to give but a life estate, roluit non
dixit, we must take what he said, not what he meant. Such was the language
used by Black, J., In Bender v. Fleurie, 2 Gr. 345.
Since the Act of April 27, 1855, P. L. 368, estates tail are converted Into
estates in fee. Carroll v. Burns, 108 Pa. 386. Section one of said act provides, "Whenever hereafter by any gift, conveyance, or devise, an estate in
fee tail would be created according to the existing laws of this state It shall
be taken and construed to be an estate in fee simple and as such shall be-inheritable.
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The purpose of said Act is to convert words of entailment in estates
thereafter created, into words of general inheritance in fee, and thereby repeals the statute de donis conditionatibus. Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa.95. While
a fee tail can no longer subsist, it may still be created, to be by force of said
Act transformed into a fee simple. Seybert v. Hibbert, 5 Pa. Super. 538.
In view of these authorities we hold that the devise to Mary Stokes gave
her an estate tail, which the Act of Apr. 27, 1855, P. L. 368, transformed into
a fee simple. Since this is so, on the death of Mary Stokes, intestate, the
property in question did not descend to the plaintiff and his younger brother
to the exclusion of the children of Mary Stokes by her second husband. As
the statement of the case informs us that the plaintiff is bringing this action
to obtain sole possession of the land we are constrained to direct a verdict.
for the defendants.
OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT.

The language of the will, at common law, created a fee tail special. The
first section of the act of April 27th, 1855, 1 P. & L. 1882, requires that whenever any devise would according to the then existing law, create an estate
In fee tail, it shall be construed to be an estate in fee simple. No distinction is made between fees tail general and fees tail special. But for this act,
the land would, at the death of Mary Stokes, have passed to Harry the oldest son, to the exclusion of his whole brother. The half-brothers cohld In no
event have taken. But the act of 1855 has converted what would have been
a fee tall special, into a fee simple. The land descended equally to all the
sons. Schrecongost v. West, 210 Pa. 7.
Judgment affirmed.

DEMPFOLD vs. HARBISON.

Lien-Sale of Land by Judgment Debtor-Revival

of Judgment

to

Terre-

Tenant-Sheriff's Sale.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Dempfold had a judgment against Hartman. Before 5 years ran by
Hartman conveyed his land" to Harbison, who took possession. Dempfold
then obtained within the 5 years a confession of judgment of revival to
which Harbison was not a party. Seven years after the recovery of the
original judgment Dempfold Issued an execution and caused a Sheriff's
sale of the land, becoming the purchaser. This is ejectment to obtain possession.
Clark for the Plaintiff.
Cited Lupk vs. Davidson, 3 P. & W. 229.
Thompson for the Defendant.
The revival of z judgment to which the terre tenant is not a party will
not continue the lien as to him. Armstrong's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 352; McCoy
vs. Clark, et al., 82 Pa. 457.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
COHEN, J.:-A judgment lien had its origin in statutory law, at common
law vobody had a lien on the debtor's land by virtue of a judgment except
the King. The first acts creating a lien on land for the satisfaction of a judgment were statutes of Westminster 2d, 13 ed. 1, C. 18, which gave the creditor the right to hold a moiety of the debtor's land until the debt be satisfied.
The later statutes have prescribed the number of years the lien is to run
together with its kind or character of the judgment, with reference to its
capacity for creating a lien, together with its revival.
In the case of a terre-tenant, who is one who has an estate in land, coupled with the actual possession, which he derives mediately or immediately
from the judgment debtor while the land was bound by the lien, there ar?
two modes of revival, (1) by agreement between the parties and terre- tenant, (2) by writ of scire facias.
In the case at bar one Dempfold had a judgment against Hartman. Be
fore the statutory period of five years had elapsed he conveyed the land to
Harbison who took possession. Dempfold then obtained within the five
years a confession of judgment of revival from Hartman to which Harbison
was not a party. Seven years after the original judgment was recovered
Dempfold issued an execution and caused a sheriff's sale of the land, becoming the purchaser himself, and-now brings this ejectment.
It is evident from the facts in this case that it does not come within the
provisions of the act of June 1, 1SS7, which provides that "no judgment shall
continue a lien on such real estate for a longer period than five years from
the date on which said judgment may be entered or revived, unless revived,
within that period, by agreement of the parties and terre-tenant, filed In writing and entered on the proper docket." This has not been .done here. The
confession of judgment by Hartman to Dempfold was not participated in by
defendant, the terre-tenant, and consequently has not been properly revived.
But It might be said that Harbison's deed was not recorded and should suffer
for his laches, because it was the usual means by which plaintiff might find
out that there was a terre-tenant. But he might, in order to be sure, have
issued a sei. fa. in neglect of which he has chosen to risk the other.
The terre-tenant or owner, at the time when this revival was sought,
was the person most interested in the proceeding, the judgment-debbor being
merely nominal, having parted with his interests. In the act of 1798, the
terre-tenant is the person first named on whom the writ is to be served,
which shows that his connection vith the reviyal was deemed of primary
importance.
The act of April 16, 1849, provitles that "in all cases when a judgment
has been or shall be regularly revived between the original parties, the period of five years, during which the l'en of the judgment continues, shall only continue to run in favor of the terre-tenant from the time that he or she
has placed the deed on record: Provided, that this act shall not apply when
the terre-tenant is in actual possession of the land bound by such judgment.
We, therefore, hold that the revival was not according to the act of June
1, 1887, (P. &'L. vol. 1. col. 2474) and as a consequence there was no revival
according to law, because the terre'tenant was not a party to their agreement. And according to the act of April 16, 1849, (P. & L. vol. 1. col. 2478)
whirh regulates the time from whicli the lien shall begin to run against the
terre-tenant excludes cases where t.e terre-tenant is in l5ossession, which is
the case at bar.
We also hold that the judgment given to Dempfold by Hartman ceased
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to exist as a lien on the land in question not being regularly revived within
ihe statutory period, and when it was sold by the sheriff the sale was illegal
we therefore conclude that no title passed to Dempfold and as a consequence
he cannot recover.
Armstrong's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 352, we think sustains this conclusion.
.Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COUR'I
The 8th section of the act of April 16th, 1849, 1P. & L. 2478, made a revival against the defendant efficacious as against a terre-tenant who
was not a party to it, unless his deed was of record or unless he had possession. If he was not in possession, and f his deed was not on record, the creditor had five years from the time whet. the deed might be recorded or pessession taken, in which to revive against him.
The act did not apply, when the terre-tenant was in actual possession of
the land. In that case the legislation prior to 1849 was applicable.
The act of June 1st, 1887, 1 P. & L. 2474 has reenacted section one of
the act of March 26th. 1827, adding to it however, the words "No proceeding
shall be available to continue the lien of said judgment against a terre-tenant, whose deed for the land bound by said judgment has been recorded except by agreement, in writing, signed by said terre-tenant, and entered on
the proper lien. docket, or the terre-tenant or. terre-tenants be named as such
in the original scire facias."
This act repeals that of April 16th, 1849, and restores the act of 1827,
with the modification that when a terre-tenant's deed is on record, at the
time of the attempted revival, he must be named as such in the scire facias,
or if an agreement is employed he must sign the agreement. Uhler v. Moses, 10 Super. 194.,
In the case before us, Harbison was in possession of the premises when
the revival occurred, but his deed was not on record. He did not become a
party to the agreement. Under the act of 1827, which is, through its repetition in that of 1887, still in force, the amicable action, not signed by the
terre-tenant, did not revive the judgment. Armstrong's Appeal, 5 W. & S.
352, t Liens. 253.
The sheriff's sale on the judgment against Hartman, took place wheil
that iudgment had lost its lien. The sale did not extinguish the ownership
of Harbison. The purchaser is not entitled to the possession,
Judgment affirmed
WM. HARMON vs. FREDERICK KELSO.
Negotiable Instruments-Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Kelso made a note at 4 months for $1000 payable to Samuel Addison or
order, which contained a warrant of attorney to confess judgment. Judgment was confessed on it, one month after it was delivered; but in some way
the note was taken from the prothonotary's office and, before maturity negotiated by Addison to Harmon. After the entry of the judgment, but before
the maturity of the note Kelso paid $SOO to Addison, having no notice that
Harmon or any one had the note. Harmon sued for the $1000.
Lindley for the plaintiff.
Judgment was asked based on act, I. Sec. 1; Act. IV, Sec. 51, 52 and
57, of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1901. The universal practice in this
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state has been to enter judgments upon warrants of attorney before maturity of the debt recited therein merely for the purpose of security by way of
lien. Integrity Ins. Co. vs. Raw., 153 Pa. 488. Volkenard vs. Dum, 143
Pa, 525.
Gardner for the defendant.
A note with warrant of attorney to confess judgment annexed is negotiable, McIntyre vs. Steel, 1 W. N. C. 494; Osborne, vs. Hawley, 19 Ohio
130.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MEMOLO, J.-This is an action of assumpsit on a note by Win. Harmon
against Frederick Kelso.
Harmon is a bona fide purchaser for value of a note made by Kelso for
$1000.00 payable to Samuel Addison or order at 4 months. The note contained power of attorney to confess judgment. Judgment was accordingly
confessed one month after delivery, but the note in some way was stolei
from the prothonotary's office after judgment was confessed and before maturity and negotiated by Addison to Harmon. Kelso not knowing who had the
note paid Addison $800.00, Harmon now sues for the value of the note.
It may seem rather harsh to enforce payment upon Kelso twice for the
same note, but public policy demands that under the existing circumstances
Kelso be liable, because if he were not, having discharged the note, it would
lay down the principle that every man coming into the possession of a negotiable instrument which this is, would have to look back and see that the
title of the one from whom the present'holder'derived it, was good, and this
would be too cumbersome and slow in the commercial world.
That it is negotiable, is 'clear, since it is 1st, In writing and signed by the
maker or drawer. 2nd, Containing an unconditional promise or order to pay
a sum certain in money. 3rd, Payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time. 4th, Payable to order or bearer. 5th, Addressed to a drawee,
he is named with reasonable certainty. Act 1, See. 1, Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1901.
In a case very much similar to the one at bar, tried in the Supreme
Court of Mass. it was held: "That a bill or note made without consideration.
or lost or stolen and afterwards negotiated to one having no .knowledge of
these facts, for a valuable consideration and in the usual course of business
his title is good, and such holder shall be entitled to receive the amount oi
the note." John Wheeler vs. Albert H. Guild, .20Pickering 545, citing to the
same effect; Miller v. Race, 1 Burk 452: Peacock vs. Rhodes, 2 Douglas 633;
Grant vs. Vaugn,- 3 Burr 1576. An1 to the same end we have the case of
Stoddard vs. Burton 41.Ia. 582.
That Harmon is a holder in dre course is seen from the statutory requirements: 1st, That note be complete and regular upon its. face. 2nd,
That he became the holder of icbefore it was overdue, and without notice that
it had been prcviously dishonored if such was the case. 3rd. That he took it in
good faith and for value. 4th, That at the time it was negotiated to him he
had not notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating it. Art. IV, sec. 52, Negotiable Ins. Act; 1901.
Judgment 'for the plaintiff.
OPINION, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
It is not distinctly ascertained whether the warrant of attorney to confess
judgment, was a warrant to confer prior to the maturity of the note, or not.
As judgment was in fact entered before maturity, we shall assume that the
warrant authorized it.
Prior to the negotiable instrument act of 1901, a rule with a warrant of
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attorney was held to be not negotiable, by Chief Justice Gibson. Overton v.
Tyler, 3 Pa. 346. In that case the warrant was at once to confess judgment,
and judgment was conferred before maturity. The act of 1901 enacts that a
rule that otherwise would be negotiable, shall not be made non-negotiable
by the fact that it "authorizes a confession of judgment, it the instrument be
not paid at maturity," but this language does not apply to a warrant to confession of judgment, before maturity. Milton Nat. Bank v. Beaver, 25 Super.
494. The note in suit is therefore non-negotiable. It follows that the payment by Kelso to Addison was a good payment. Kelso could not be obliged
to pay that sum again.
It iollows also, that Harmon cannot, in his own name, sue for even the
$200 still unpaid.
The note had been deposited in the prothonotary's office and a judgment
had been in fact confessed upon it. The note then transit.i rem judicatam.
it was merged, in the judgment, that is, it ceased to have any legal existence;
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346; Jones v. Johnson 3 W. & S. 276; Murray v.
Weigle, 118 Pa. 159; Hartman v. Ogborn, 54 Pa. 120. The fact that the paper on which it was written, was taken from the prothonotary's office, and
negotiated to the pialniff, did not recall it to legal life. It remained dead.
No action can be sustained upon it. Interes9t republicae ut sit
finis
letimit. For any fraud practiced as Harmon in selling him, as a valid security, that which had become legally void, he must resort to another remedy.
Kelso is not responsible for it. T4' make him liable in the action, would
make him an innoccnt person the indemnitor of Harmon. This must not be
allowed.
Judgment reversed.

BOOK REVIEW.
The Law of Crimes. By John Wilder May, Little, Brown & Co.
This work is too well known, and its merits have been too well appreciated to require more than a brief notice. For many years it has been the
tavorite text book in law schools and among office students of the law.
The new edition, prepared by Mr.. Bigelow of the Law School of the University of Chicago, enhances very appreciably the merits of the work. The
number of pages is not materially increased, but they are larger.
Substantially the same arrangement is preserved. The preliminary part of the
work, devoted to "general principles" is admirable. Several of the crimes
are treated with exceptional clearness; a good sketch of the .distinction between attempt, preparation and intent is given at page 165. The chapter on
Criminal Procedure Is clear and sufficiently full for a general elementary
work. The book can be unreservedly commended to lawyers and to stu.dents of law. One is not worthy of the name of lawyer, eschew criminal
practice as he will, who does not become acquainted with substantially all
that this book exhibits, concerning criminal law.
The Law of Bailments. By James Schouler; Little, Brown & Co.
James Schouler is too well known, as historian, essayist, law lecturer
and law text book writer, to require more than mention of the fact that a
text book of convenient size, on the subject of Bailments, has been pre
pared by him for the use of law students and lawyers. It is based on his
larger work and upon notes by him in his lectures as law professor. The
type is large and beautiful, the paper of excellent quality. In 400 pages, a
summary of the whole law is presented. Over 60 pages are devoted to the
topic of Carriers of Passengers. An interesting chapter of 20 pages, is given to the subject of Connecting Carriers. The law of bailments has undergone an immense development in modern times, and its importance augments daily. Informed with the contents of this book, the student or lawyer
is prepared to advance his knowledge of the details of any department of
the subject, with care and a sense of security. One can recommend this
l'ook with no misgivings. It will hear testing.

